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After all the evidence at a trial has been presented, a jury is often
still in doubt as to the true facts of the case. The law solves this prob-
lem in a simple way-through its imposition of the burden of persua-
sion. This doctrine identifies the party bearing the burden of persua-
sion for each material issue of fact, and it specifies the degree to which
the jury must be convinced by the evidence in order to find in favor of
that party." In most civil cases, the requisite degree of persuasion is "by
a preponderance of the evidence." This traditionally requires demon-
strating that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its
nonexistence.2 In a typical tort case, for example, if the jury views the
likelihood of the defendant having negligently injured the plaintiff as
two-thirds, then the plaintiff will be awarded damages; if the jury
views the likelihood as only one-third, then the plaintiff will be denied
recovery.
The all-or-nothing charter of this rule has produced substantial
controversy. Critics ask why there should be full recovery when the
probability of the events having actually taken place as alleged is just
slightly greater than one-half, whereas there is no recovery when the
probability is just slightly less than one-half.' The dramatic difference
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1 For a general discussion of the doctrine of burden of "proof," see McCoRMICK's
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 783-802 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMIcK]; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 240-53 (2d ed.
1977). There are actually two facets of the burden of proof: the burden of produc-
tion-i.e. the burden of coming forth with some initial evidence-and the burden of
persuasion-i.e. the burden of convincing the jury beyond some stated standard of
doubt. This Article is concerned with only the burden of persuasion and will use only
that term.
* MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 794.
s See, e.g., Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard:
Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FouND.
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in outcome, based on only a very small difference in the weight of the
evidence, seems unduly harsh. The crudeness of the rule stands in
sharp contrast to the law's development of more flexible rules in other
situations, such as those involving comparative negligence and contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasers, where the law eschews an all-or-nothing
approach and apportions the liability for the harm.4
A number of scholars have advocated an alternative approach-the
expected value rule-to deal with this problem.5 Under this rule, the
award of damages is calculated by multiplying the probability that the
defendant is culpable by the magnitude of the damages. If the plaintiff
suffered damages equal to $100 and the likelihood that the defendant
caused the harm is two-thirds, then the plaintiff would recover $67; if
the likelihood is one-third, then the plaintiff would recover $33."
In a recent article, Professor Kaye defended the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard by pointing out that it results, overall, in fewer
dollars being erroneously paid.' Using statistical decision theory tech-
niques, he demonstrated that, if the true state of affairs could be ascer-
tained, the average incorrect payment made under the preponderance-
of-the-evidence rule would be less than the average incorrect payment
made under the expected value rule.8
RESEARCH J. 487; King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexistiiig Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353
(1981).
1 W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 50, 67, at 305-10, 433-39
(4th ed. 1971). ,
5 See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 3; King, supra note 3, at 1384; cf. Rizzo & Arnold,
Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1399 (1980) (advocating apportioning damages among multiple tortfeasers in accor-
dance with a concept of "relative causation"); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort
Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713 (1982) (urging that liability
be imposed on multiple defendants in proportion to the risks created by each
defendant).
I There is precedent for the award of damages against a defendant when the like-
lihood of his culpability is substantially less than one-half. In Sindell v. Abbott Labora-
tories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980), the California Supreme Court held that if the plaintiff, who allegedly had been
injured by the drug diethylstilbestol (DES), could prove her allegations of negligence
and damages, she could recover from the companies that had manufactured the drug in
proportion to their respective DES sales. The dissent correctly pointed out that "a par-
ticular defendant may be held proportionately liable even though mathematically it is
much more likely than not that it played no role whatever is causing plaintiffs inju-
ries." Id. at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (emphasis in original); see also
Kaye, supra note 3, at 490.
Kaye, supra note 3, at 496-500.
a Professor Kaye demonstrated, formally, that the average of the absolute values of
the incorrect payments made under the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule would be
less than the average of the absolute values of the incorrect payments made under the
expected value rule. Id.
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This Article expands that analysis by looking at the number, size,
and distribution of errors under the two rules. It examines the general
character of the mistakes made under each of the rules. The analysis
shows that there are a number of different measures with which to
describe these mistakes, and that neither rule is superior under all of
the measures. Accordingly, the Article shows that any single index of
the errors emerging under a given rule produces a misleading picture of
the overall accuracy of that rule.
I. EXAMPLE
The following highly simplified example will be used throughout
the Article to provide a concrete sense for the more generally developed
mathematical results.9 Hypothesize a chemical factory that employs 400
workers to produce phenoxy acids for herbicides. Assume that 300 of
the workers develop stomach cancer and seek compensation from their
employer, and that the only issue is whether the injury is work-related.
Large-scale epidemiological studies show that the incidence of stomach
cancer among individuals similarly exposed to phenoxy acids is consis-
tent around the country and approximately three-fourths. These studies
also show, however, that one-fourth of the general population develops
stomach cancer as a result of other causes. Finally, assume that every
case of employee stomach cancer involves the same damages, which we
denote as D.
II. NUMBER OF ERRORS
Each of the workers who develops stomach cancer in our example
will be able to demonstrate that it is statistically more probable than
not that his injury was "caused" by working in the factory. This read-
ily follows from the epidemiological studies linking exposure to phe-
noxy acids with a high incidence of the disease and demonstrating a
much lower incidence of the disease among the general population. The
studies predict that 300 of the exposed workers will contract stomach
cancer; and, in our example, 300 of the employees actually do contract
cancer. On average, 100 of these workers would have developed cancer
due to natural causes. The other 200 workers represent the expected
number of additional cases of cancer associated with employment in the
factory. Accordingly, the probability that any single worker who devel-
ops cancer actually contracted the disease as a result of his employment
9 This example represents a slight modification of the one used by Professor Kaye,
id. at 492-93.
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is 200/300 or two-thirds.10
Under the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, each of the 300
workers will prevail, because the probability that his injury is work-
related is greater than one-half.1" Since approximately two-thirds of the
cancers were in fact caused by the chemical factory, two-thirds of these
cases will be decided correctly. The remaining one-third of the
cases-those in which the cancer was caused by other factors not attrib-
utable to the company-will be decided erroneously.
Under the expected value rule, each of the 300 workers will re-
ceive damages in the amount of 2/3 D (the probability that the cancer
was "caused" by exposure in the workplace (p = 2/3) times the amount
of the damages (D)). Accordingly, each of the 300 cases will be decided
erroneously. The 200 workers whose damages were actually caused by
the factory will receive 3 D too little, whereas the 100 cases where the
damages were not caused by the factory will receive 2/3 D too much.
As a general proposition, the number of errors2 under the pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence rule is:
No. of Errors = (l-p) x (No. of Cases) when p >
No. of Errors = p x (No. of Cases) when p <
where p = probability that the defendant is culpable under
10 This is correct to a first-order approximation, but it ignores a second-order
effect. While some of the 300 workers will have contracted cancer solely from exposure
in the workplace and some will have contracted cancer solely from natural causes, some
will have contracted cancer from both exposure in the workplace and natural causes.
This latter category of cases occurs when nature and the company "each shoot a gun."
See generally Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 119 P.2d 1 (1948). Who should be
viewed as liable in such a situation? See Rizzo & Arnold, supra note 5, for a discussion
of this problem and a proposed methodology for the apportionment of liability in such
cases. In most contexts, this second-order effect can be ignored. When the occurrence of
each cause is independent of the occurrence of other causes, the frequency with which
the two factors act simultaneously is the product of the probabilities associated with
each factor. If each probability is small, the product is very small and can be
disregarded.
' The workers will prevail, provided the court accepts the introduction of "justifi-
ably naked statistical evidence." See Kaye, supra note 3, at 492 n.22. Many courts have
not been receptive to purely statistical evidence where no substantial foundation has
been laid for the statistical analysis. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438
P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968); State v. Sneed, 76 N.M. 349, 414 P.2d 858 (1966).
But see Kaminsky v. Hertz Corp., 94 Mich. App. 356, 288 N.W.2d 426 (1979). Schol-
ars have also expressed reservations at the use of explicitly statistical evidence to aid
factfinding. See, e.g., Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971).
"s Throughout this Article, references to measures such as the number of errors or
the overall size of the errors refer to the expected value of the attribute under scrutiny.
The equations assume that a large number of cases are subjected to the applicable
burden-of-persuasion rule, and calculate the average magnitude of the measure being
analyzed. The outcome in a single lawsuit or very small number of lawsuits may differ
from this figure.
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the true state of the facts.
In contrast, under the expected value rule:
No. of Errors = No. of Cases
provided p / 0 or 1.
Which rule is superior? In our example, the preponderance-of-
the-evidence rule resulted in 100 errors, and the expected value rule
resulted in 300 errors. More generally, since 0 < p < 1 in every case,
the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule always results in fewer errone-
ously decided cases. However, this measure tells us nothing about the
size of errors and the distribution of the errors among plaintiffs and
defendants.1 It is to these more illuminating measures that we now
turn.
III. SIZE OF ERRORS
A. Magnitude of the Mistakes
The sum of the wrongful payments under the two rules presents
another measure of their relative desirability. The smaller the overall
size of the wrongful payments under a rule, the more desirable, ceteris
paribus, the rule.
A "wrongful payment" can arise in two situations. First, when-
ever the defendant pays the plaintiff in a lawsuit where, under the true
state of the facts, the defendant would have been found innocent,
14
there is a wrongful payment. Second, whenever the plaintiff fails to
recover in a lawsuit where, under the true state of the facts, the plain-
tiff would be entitled to recovery, 5 there is a wrongful "pay-
ment"-that is, the damage is wrongfully paid for by the plaintiff in-
15 The number or frequency of errors 'produced under each of the two decision
rules forms, by itself, a very weak basis for selecting a superior rule. But see Ball, The
Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14 VAND. L. REv. 807,
817 (1961) (the proper standard of proof is the one that causes the smallest number of
mistakes); Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. Cm. L.
REv. 34, 35-36 (1979) (the only question in deciding whether to apply probability
theory to legal factfinding is "whether the technique would reduce the number of errors
in the factfinding"); ef. M. FiNKESTEmN, QUANTITATIVE MErHODs IN LAW 59-104
(1978) (one of the goals behind the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is minimi-
zation of the number of erroneously decided cases).
14 This is commonly called a "false positive." A false positive occurs whenever a
test announces that the attribute for which the test is designed to check does exist in the
particular sample, and, in reality, the attribute is absent. A false positive is a "false
alarm."
1 This is commonly called a "false negative." A false negative occurs whenever a
testfails to find the attribute for which the test is designed to check-yet, the attribute
actually exists in the sampled item.
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stead of the defendant. The sum of these two types of wrongful
payments for each rule, over all cases, represents the aggregate errors
produced by that rule.
In the hypothetical posited above, the preponderance-of-the-evi-
dence test results in 200 cases decided correctly and 100 cases decided
incorrectly. No wrongful payment occurs when a case is decided cor-
rectly. In each of the incorrectly decided cases, there is a wrongful pay-
ment of D. Accordingly, the magnitude of the wrongful payments
under the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, for all of the cases, is
100 D.
The expected value rule results in 300 incorrectly decided cases;
however, the size of the wrongful payment is not the same in each of
these cases. In 200 of the cases, the chemical company in fact caused
the injury and a payment of / D was wrongfully withheld. The total
of wrongfully withheld payments equals 67 D. In 100 of the cases, the
chemical company did not in fact cause the cancer and an excessive
payment of 2/3 D was wrongfully made. The total wrongful payments
for these 100 cases is 67 D. The magnitude of the wrongful payments
under the expected value rule for all 300 cases is, accordingly, 67 D +
67 D, or 134 D.
As a general proposition, the sum of the wrongful payments under
the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule is:
Wrongful Payments = No. of Wrongly x Magnitude of
Decided Cases Wrongful Payment
= (l-p) x (No. of Cases) x D
= (1-p)D x (No. of Cases) for p > 1h.'
Under the expected value rule:
Wrongful Payments = No. of Wrongly X Magnitude of
Decided Cases Wrongful Payment= No. of) 1p) (I-)x assJxp
p Cases x (1-p) + _P) x (No. of) x pD
- 2p(1-p)D x (No. of Cases).
1' When p < 1, the magnitude of the wrongful payments is:
Wrongful Payments No. of Wrongly Magnitude of
Decided Cases x Wrongful Payment
= p x (No. of Cases) x D
= pD x (No. of Cases).
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Accordingly, the wrongful payments under the preponderance-of-the-
evidence rule are always less than the wrongful payments under the
expected value rule. This can be seen easily by forming the ratio:
Wrongful Payments
Under P-O-T-E Rule (1-p)D x (No. of Cases)
Wrongful Payments 2p(1-p)D x (No. of Cases)
Under E-V Rule
1
- __ < 1, whenever p > 1A.
1 7
2p
B. Large Mistakes
A second and quite different way of viewing the size of the errors
under the two rules is to focus on large errors. One might wish to
employ a rule which minimizes large errors, even though the overall
wrongful payments are not necessarily minimized, because of a belief
that individuals are much more willing to accept small errors than
large ones in a case involving them. A large error is more jolting to a
sense of fairness than a small error; it more readily leads to a cry of
injustice.
While there is no "natural" index of large errors, statisticians fre-
quently measure the degree of deviation between a series of reported
outcomes and their true values by adding together the square of the
difference between each outcome and its true value.18 This effectively
weights each error by the size of the error. The greater the error, the
greater the weighting factor, and, accordingly, the greater the measure
of large errors.
Under the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, each of the 100 in-
' This conclusion holds both when p > 1h and when p < Y. When p < V4:
Wrongful Payments
Under P-O-T-E Rule pD x (No. of Cases)
Wrongful Payments 2p(1-p)D x (No. of Cases)
Under E-V Rule
1
- < 1, whenever p < I&
2(l-p)
The only exception to the general conclusion occurs where p = i. In this case, the sum of the
wrongful payments under the two rules is the same.
"8 See, e.g., D.S. MOORE, STAnSTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 166-70
(1979).
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correctly decided cases involves a wrongful payment, or error, of D.
Thus, the measure of large errors under this rule is 100 D2. In con-
trast, under the expected value rule, the measure of large errors is
200(1/3 D)2 + 100(2/3 D)2 = 67 D2.
From the perspective of large errors, then, the relative superiority
of the rules turns out to be opposite that which arises by simply looking
at the sum of all the errors. When each error is weighted by the size of
the error, the sum of all the weighted errors, over any group of cases, is
less under the expected value rule than under the preponderance-of-
the-evidence rule. The expected value rule produces, in this sense,
fewer large errors than does the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule.
As a general proposition, under the preponderance-of-the-evidence
rule:
Measure of
Large Errors
= sum (Magnitude of the Error)2
in Each Case
= (l-p) x (No. of Cases) x D2
= p x (No. of Cases) x D'
when p > 1
when p < 1/
Under the expected value rule:
Measure of
Large Errors
= sum (Magnitude of the Error)2
in Each Case
= p x (No. of Cases) x ((1-p)D)2 +
(l-p) x (No. of Cases) x (pD)1
= p(l-p) x (No. of Cases) x D'
It readily follows that the expected value rule produces fewer large
errors, under the above definition, than does the preponderance-of-the-
evidence rule."9 This can be seen by forming the ratio:
" When p = 1 or 0, the sum of the squares of the errors under the two rules is
the same.
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Measure of Large Errors
Under P-O-T-E Rule (l-p) x (No. of Cases) x D2
when p > 1h
Measure of Large Errors p(l-p) x (No. of Cases) x D2
Under E-V Rule
1
- when p >
P
Measure of Large Errors
Under P-O-T-E Rule p x (No. of Cases) x D'
when p < 12
Measure of Large Errors p(l-p) x (No. of Cases) x D'
Under E-V Rule
1
= when p < h.
1-p
Since the probability "p" is always less than 1, each of these fractions
will always be greater than 1. Accordingly, the measure of large errors
under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard will always be
greater than the measure of large errors under the expected value
standard.
Which criterion is more important: minimizing total errors or
minimizing large errors? Each criterion measures the degree of accu-
racy of the decision rules, but they measure accuracy in different ways.
The theory of utility demonstrates that the impact of a charge im-
posed upon an individual is not proportional to the size of the charge.20
A person may be quite willing to bet $1.00 that a quarter, when
flipped, will turn up heads, if the reward for heads is $2.50, but be
unwilling to enter into the same wager when the stakes are $100,000
and $250,000. Small losses can often be paid "out-of-pocket" or from
savings, and impose little hardship. Large losses can force a person to
sell his residence, reduce his standard-of-living, or cause bankruptcy,
and, accordingly, involve substantial hardship. The degree of hardship
actually imposed by a given charge increases geometrically with the size
of the charge.
The use of a loss function that treats each "unit of error" equally
ignores the disproportionate difference in hardship caused by large er-
rors. By grouping together all errors, it obscures the greater weight that
20 See Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Facfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv.
1065, 1069 & n.4 (1968). See generally R.D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DEci-
SIONS 12-38 (1957).
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ordinarily should be given to these errors.
The use of such a linear loss function also obscures the fact that
corporations typically have much greater financial resources at their
disposal than do individuals. A large firm is unlikely to be hurt by an
erroneous payment that would dwarf the lifetime income of a worker.
Moreover, large corporations are in a far superior position-both from
an informational perspective and a financial reserve perspective-to ac-
quire insurance against potential risks. Thus, the impact of an error
also depends heavily on the nature of the party that has to absorb the
error.
Overall, the degree of hardship per unit of error depends upon two
separate factors: the size of the error and the character of the party on
whom the error falls. Accordingly, in designing a system that minimizes
losses, one should ordinarily employ a nonlinear function that gives
greater weight to large errors.21 This more closely approximates the
actual disutility associated with such errors. Treating all units of error
equally assumes a factual situation that frequently does not accord with
reality.
IV. DISTRIBUTION OF ERRORS
The distribution of the errors under each rule reflects the degree
of bias produced by the rule.2 2 When the payments wrongfully made by
defendants equal the payments wrongfully withheld from plaintiffs,
there is no bias in the decision rule. In contrast, when the errors sys-
tematically fall more heavily on one side or the other, there is bias. The
inquiry here is into the degree to which the errors under each of the
rules fall unevenly among plaintiffs and defendants.2
Under the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, each of the one
hundred incorrectly decided cases results in an erroneous payment by
the chemical company of damages equal to D. None of the wrongful
"' The loss function, ideally, should take into account the actual disutility associ-
ated with each size of error for each party. Thus, it should reflect the fact that what
appears as a large error to an individual would often be construed as a relatively minor
matter to a major corporation. However, the administrative costs for developing each
party's utility curve, in every lawsuit, are likely to be prohibitively high.
"' A decision rule is unbiased if it does not systematically overstate or understate
the true value of the variable being measured. See generally D.S. MOORE, supra note
18, at 106-10.
s A goal of equalizing errors among plaintiffs and defendants reflects a notion of
"blindfolded" justice. It reflects the view that false positives and false negatives deserve
equal weight. There are, of course, several exceptional areas where this does not re-
present society's values. In the field of criminal law, for example, society accepts that
many individuals who in fact are guilty will be found innocent in order to ensure that
innocent people are much less likely to be found guilty.
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payments fall on plaintiffs, because no plaintiff who should have been
compensated, under the true state of the facts, is denied recovery.
The situation would be reversed, of course, if in our example the
probability of the company's culpability was less than one-half. Then,
because none of the workers would recover from the company, all of
the wrongful payments (the uncompensated damages borne by the em-
ployees whose cancer was, in fact, caused by exposure in the work-
place) would fall on the plaintiffs. When p < , none of the wrongful
payments fall on the company.
Under the expected value rule, the wrongful payments are much
more evenly distributed. The 200 plaintiffs who should have recovered
D but were only awarded 2/3 D are collectively undercompensated by 66
D. The 100 plaintiffs who should have received nothing but were
awarded 2/3 D are collectively overcompensated by 66 D. As a group,
then, the plaintiffs receive neither more nor less than they should re-
ceive under the true state of the facts; similarly, the defendant pays
exactly the amount for which he is liable under the true state of the
facts.
More generally, under the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, the
distribution of the errors is always lopsided. When the probability of
the defendant's liability is less than or equal to one-half, all the errors
fall on the plaintiffs. When the probability of defendant's liability is
greater than one-half, all the errors fall on the defendant.2"
Under the expected value rule, the decision is wrong in each indi-
vidual case; but, the collective errors that fall on the plaintiffs cancel
each other out, and the collective errors that fall on the defendant can-
cel each other out. While some plaintiffs are under-compensated and
others are over-compensated, they receive, as a group, exactly the
amount to which they are entitled. Similarly, the defendant pays, over-
all, exactly the amount that it owes under the true state of the facts. Its
instances of over-compensation also are offset by its instances of under-
compensation. Under the expected value rule, then, the burden of
wrongful payments that falls on each group as a whole is not only
" Because of the bias inherent in the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, particu-
larly when a single defendant faces lawsuits by many plaintiffs and the probability of
liability is the same in each case, Professor Kaye has argued that in such circumstances
the expected value rule is preferable. Kaye, supra note 3, at 502. In all other circum-
stances, Professor Kaye argues the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule is superior. The
problem with this framework is that the call to switch decision rules in a specific case
emerges only as a result of factors wholly outside the particular case at bar. It depends
on the existence of other lawsuits involving the same defendant and the same set of
facts. It seems awkward, if not unworkable, to radically change the decision rule in a
specific lawsuit depending upon what other plaintiffs may do in other lawsuits.
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equal, but also turns out to be nonexistent.
The unbiased character of the expected value rule occurs regard-
less of the probability of the defendant's culpability. Unlike the situa-
tion under the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, the pattern of the
distribution of errors between the plaintiffs and the defendant is not
affected by the weight of the evidence.
What happens, though, when one aggregates all lawsuits involving
exposure of workers to asbestos, or all lawsuits involving exposure to
Agent Orange, or all lawsuits involving traffic accidents-or all civil
litigation? Are the results different when one aggregates a large num-
ber of lawsuits involving different probabilities rather than, as in our
example, a large number of lawsuits involving the same probability?
Would the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard then result in an
unbiased distribution of errors?"
Under one unlikely factual situation, it would. If, for any group of
lawsuits, the average of the probabilities associated with the lawsuits
happened to equal the proportion of the lawsuits whose probability was
greater than one-half, then the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule
would be unbiased when applied to that group. In other words, if one
found that the average of all the p's in the group exactly equalled the
percentage of the p's that were greater than one-half, then the errone-
ous payments that would fall on the defendants would balance the erro-
neous payments that would fall on the plaintiffs."6
'5 See Kaye, supra note 3, at 503 ("On balance, [the preponderance-of-the-evi-
dence standard produces] no systematic unfairness. . . despite the apparent 'bias' for
fixed values of [p]." Based on this conclusion, Professor Kaye argues for the general use
of the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule.).
S" If there are n cases in a group of lawsuits, with an average probability of T of
defendants having caused the injuries, then the expected value rule would require the
defendants to pay total damages of npD. Since the expected value rule has been shown
to be unbiased, npD represents the amount that the defendants must pay under the
preponderance-of-the-evidence rule for it also to be unbiased.
Assume that, among the n cases in the group, m have probabilities greater than 'A.
Then, under the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, the total payments by the defen-
dants will be mD. Accordingly, the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule will be unbi-
ased only if npD = mD or, equivalently, = m/n. The preponderance-of-the-evi-
dence rule will be unbiased only if the average probability of all the lawsuits in the
group equals the frequency with which the p's exceed 1h.
Note that this derivation continues the assumption we first made-that the dam-
ages "D" are the same for each plaintiff. When this assumption is relaxed, the general
conclusion does not change; but, the analysis becomes more complex. See infra text
accompanying note 29.
An example may help to illuminate the analysis. Assume that there are four law-
suits in a group with probabilities of A, 1/, 3, and M, and that all of the lawsuits
involve the same damages "D." The average of the probabilities is .38. The proportion
of the probabilities with p > is .25.
For this particular group, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard will be bi-
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While there are no empirical statistics with which to estimate the
distribution of probabilities for different categories of lawsuits, it ap-
pears that this hypothesized factual situation is not realistic. Lawsuits
are usually not brought where the likelihood of prevailing is very low.
This is especially so with personal injury litigation where suits typi-
cally are brought under a contingent fee arrangement. This produces a
strong incentive among plaintiffs' attorneys to weed out those cases
where the probability of success is low."'
Accordingly, most classes of lawsuits probably include a higher
proportion of cases where the chance of recovery is greater than one-
half. In these situations, the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule will be
biased in favor of plaintiffs.
The situation is somewhat more complex when one aggregates all
lawsuits that might be brought rather than all lawsuits that are actually
brought. When the set of cases to be analyzed is expanded to include all
plaintiffs who are injured, whether or not they bring a lawsuit, then
the normal filtering out of cases with a low probability of success no
longer occurs. Would the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard then
result in an unbiased distribution of errors?
The answer, again, seems to be "no." There are, perhaps, millions
of probabilities associated with this larger set of cases. Some of the po-
tential lawsuits would have very small probabilities; others would have
probabilities approaching one; many would fall between these two
poles. Yet, it would be extraordinary if the average of all these
probabilities equalled or even came close to the proportion having a
probability greater than one-half.2" Moreover, when one relaxes the as-
sumption that each of the potential lawsuits involves the same damages
and moves to the more realistic situation where the lawsuits involve
different damages, then it would be just a "fluke" if the necessary dis-
tribution of probabilities occurred for the preponderance-of-the-evi-
dence rule to be unbiased.29
ased in favor of the defendants. This readily follows from tracing through the payments
that will be made. Only one lawsuit will result in the defendants' paying damages (the
case where p = Y). Thus, the total damages paid will be D. However, the total dam-
ages that should be paid by the defendants in order for the erroneous payments made
by the defendants to balance the payments wrongfully withheld from the plaintiffs is
% D + 1A D + 3A D + Y4 D = 1.5 D or 150% of the damages that are required by
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
27 See generally Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW AND Soc'y REv. 95 (1974) (plaintiff's attorneys in
personal injury cases generally have a one-time relationship with the client and thus
have no client-oriented incentives beyond the outcome of the immediate litigation).
28 See supra note 26 for a concrete example showing how these two characteristics
of a "typical" probability distribution are unlikely to equal each other.
29 Let the damages associated with lawsuit k be Dk and the probability that the
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V. CONCLUSION
The above analysis shows the critical importance of the criteria
used to select the "best" decision rule. This problem exists even when
there is a single objective: reducing errors in factfinding. If the goal is
to minimize the number of erroneously decided cases or the sum of the
wrongful payments that are made, the preponderance-of-the-evidence
rule emerges as the superior choice. However, if the goal is to minimize
making large errors or to avoid bias in the distribution of the errors
among plaintiffs and defendants, the expected value rule emerges as the
superior choice. Neither of the two rules is preferable under all of the
tests.30
On what basis should one select the criteria to be used to deter-
mine the best decision rule? This Article has proceeded on the assump-
tion that the best burden-of-persuasion rule is the one that, in some
general sense, results in the fewest errors. A burden-of-persuasion rule,
however, is much more than a procedural device for resolving uncer-
tainty at the conclusion of a trial. Professor Robinson has pointed out
defendant in the lawsuit is culpable be pk. Then, the appropriate total payment by all
defendants for a decision rule to be unbiased is:
n
2 PkDk where n = number of potential lawsuits in the group.
k=1
Let 1k = 1 if Pk > and Ik = 0 if pk < . Then the total payment that will be made
under the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule is:-
n
1kDk
k=1
The preponderance-of-the-evidence rule will be unbiased only if:
n n
2 PkDk = k;l=kDk"
k=1 k=1
SO This Article has conceptualized the problem as a search for the "true" cause of
the harm. Note, though, that one might impose liability not in terms of causation but
rather in terms of the imposition of risk. See Robinson, supra note 5 ( in multiple
causation cases, liability should be imposed in proportion to the risks created by each
defendant); see also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132 (apportioning liability among producers of drug based on market share),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
This alternative conceptualization of the problem readily leads to selection of the
expected value rule over the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule for determining the
amount of damages properly due from each defendant. The "factory" and "nature" are
viewed as the sources of the risk, and liability is imposed in proportion to the magni-
tude of the risk created by each "defendant." The company would have to pay for
damages in proportion to the risk created by it, and the plaintiff would have to bear the
costs associated with the risk created by nature.
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that in some types of situations, it may fully determine liability."1 For
example, in the context of the DES cases (a series of lawsuits against
manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) alleging that the
drug caused cancer in the female offspring of women who took the
drug), 2 "a defendant is no better able to disprove causal responsibility
than the plaintiff is to prove it. The placement of the burden, as a
practical matter, is dispositive."33 Accordingly, the selection of the bur-
den-of-persuasion rule may substantially affect which segment of soci-
ety shoulders unavoidable losses.
The most appropriate burden-of-persuasion rule, then, may vary
from one type of lawsuit to another. 4 In every case, the law seeks to
minimize errors. But, since the effects of the rule will extend deeply
into other policy domains as well, criteria other than error minimiza-
tion must also be used. 5 The selection of a burden of persuasion rule
may influence, for example, the degree to which pharmaceutical com-
panies are willing to develop and market new drugs. It may affect in-
novation in the chemical pesticides industry. It may influence the extent
to which individuals and companies alike take out insurance, and, ac-
cordingly, the extent to which the cost of injuries is spread over broad
segments of society.3
Studies of jury deliberations suggest that jurors readily appreciate
the need to apply different burden of persuasion rules to different situa-
tions. 7 Although jurors are usually instructed in civil cases to apply the
preponderance-of-the-evidence rule, they frequently apply the expected
value rule. Where there is uncertainty over the plaintiff's right to re-
3' Robinson, supra note 5, at 729.
" E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
31 Robinson, supra note 5, at 729.
3 Indeed, the most appropriate burden-of-persuasion rule may vary among the
different issues in a single lawsuit. For example, one might impose a higher burden-of-
persuasion requirement in connection with the determination of liability than in con-
nection with the determination of the amount of damages.
35 See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Cost, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 156-66 (R. Dorfman & N.
Dorfman 2d ed. 1977) (liability in tort should not be imposed on the party causing the
damage, but on the party who can prevent the damage at the smallest cost).
36 Reflecting the variety of policies effectuated by the burden-of-proof rule, the
law cu'rently applies different burdens of persuasion to different situations. In criminal
cases, the burden of persuasion is "beyond a reasonable doubt." In a few exceptional
civil cases, a higher standard is imposed than a preponderance-of-the-evidence-a re-
quirement of "clear and convincing evidence." This higher standard applies to: (1)
charges of fraud, (2) suits to establish the terms of a lost will, and (3) suits for the
specific performance of an oral contract. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 793-98.
37 See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 163-67 (1966)
(judges and jurors sometimes interpret burden-of-proof rules differently in close cases).
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cover, a jury may reduce the amount of the award, for example from
$150,000 to $100,000, to reflect this uncertainty. Similarly, a jury will
on occasion modify its proposed award as a result of its views on the
impact of the proposed judgment on the specific parties to the litigation.
This lessens the force, as a practical matter, for abandoning the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, even in those situations where
it appears least appropriate. When jurors sense the need to apply a
different burden of persuasion requirement, they often do so.-8 Of
course, this does not obviate the need to carefully construct standards
applicable to each category of lawsuits. It shows, though, that the ex-
isting legal system has more flexibility than appears from simply look-
ing at the instructions given to juries. 9
Overall, then, this Article demonstrates that designing the best
burden of persuasion rule is more complex than has been suggested. 0
Even when the objective is to minimize errors, the analysis shows that
no single, general answer to the question is possible.
" Id. at 166.
" See Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1071 (1964)
("Reform of private law is notoriously hard to effectuate, and in the long interim there
is room for the jury's touch. Further, there is not inconsiderable evidence that jury
resistance to a rule is often a catalyst of change.").
In the federal district courts, approximately 70% of all cases are decided by a
judge without a jury. 1980 PROC. OF JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. 404 (table C-7). This
lessens the degree to which jury resistance to a rule may be relied upon to produce
change.
0 Note, also, that the two rules impose substantially different administrative costs
on society. The preponderance-of-the-evidence rule filters out cases where, even though
the damages are high, the likelihood of prevailing is low. Many of these cases would be
brought under the expected value rule because plaintiffs would be virtually assured of
some recovery to pay for the ligitation.
Moreover, for every lawsuit that goes to trial, the expected value rule injects an
additional issue into the litigation. On top of all the issues otherwise present in the case,
the parties also have to litigate the magnitude of the probability "p" that the defendant
caused the damage. Thus, in terms both of the number of lawsuits and the number of
issues in each lawsuit, the preponderance-of-the-evidence rule is an "efficient" way to
resolve uncertainty in factfinding compared to the expected value rule.
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